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Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter contains a scene so riveting and nuanced
that it is destined to enter - if it is not there already - the canon of ‘great
moments in cinema’, along with the baby carriage scene from Battleship
Potemkin, the shower scene from Psycho, and the faked orgasm scene from
When Harry Met Sally. But dramatic impact aside, an analysis of the first
Russian Roulette scene from The Deer Hunter also provides a metaphor for
virtually the entire corpus of social and political philosophy. A full and more
formal cashing out of these parallels is subject for another day - or lifetime!1
But the scene also depicts at least one - but arguably several - egregious
errors in interactive reasoning. And so here I want to confine myself to the
following question: Are those errors just Kahneman-Tversky-type glitches in the
characters’ capacities to reason - glitches which are certainly understandable
given the highly stressful conditions under which they are required to perform?
If so, there is grist aplenty for psychology in The Deer Hunter, but little or none
for rational choice theory. Or does the scene reveal a genuine inadequacy in
our current understanding of interactive rationality - the resolution of which
would have profound implications for rational choice theory and its myriad
applications? I suspect the latter. Let’s see if I am right.
 I. THE ONE-IN-SIX GAME
 There is much worthy of analysis leading up the scene in question, but for our
current purposes I will cut straight to the chase. Mike and Nick have been
captured by the Vietcong and are being forced at gunpoint to play alternating
Russian Roulette (ARR). Presumably the VC have opted for ARR over Non-
Alternative Russian Roulette (NARR) for the (albeit perverse) added pleasure
of knowing that one captive is desperately wishing the death of his own
comrade.
The rules of the game - if ‘rules’ they be - are unclear.2 But we will




The VC leader places one bullet in a six-chamber revolver, spins the
chambers, then the pistol itself. The player indicated by the barrel plays first. If
he survives, the chambers are spun again, the gun is passed to the second
player, he plays, the chambers are spun, back to the first player, and so on,
until one player is dead.3 And what the winner wins, presumably, is transfer to
a prisoner-of-war camp that takes greater cognizance of the Geneva and
Hague Conventions.
Refusal:
The victims of this macabre spectacle are prodded into compliance with the
threat of being thrown into an all-but-submerged enclosure infested with water
rats, from which, we are to understand, one’s chances of survival are even less
than had he continued to participate. In short, we are to suppose that each
player prefers life and liberty to life alone, himself to his comrade but his
comrade alive to dead, death later to death sooner, and virtually anything to the
‘pit’.
Reversal:
But neither is turning the gun on one’s co-player -  in the hope of eliminating
him as a competitor - a live option. In principle this should just amuse the VC.
After all, all I have done, in effect, is just converted our game of  ARR to an
Alternating Dueling Game (ADG).4 In ARR, neither the first player nor the
second has any advantage provided either the game is spun (and therefore of
potentially infinite length), or else unspun but consisting in an even number of
possible rounds. If uneven, however, the advantage goes to whomever plays
second. So by ‘reversing’ I am, in effect, simply cheating the spin of the barrel.
But presumably the VC opted for ARR rather than ADG because of the added
horror of pulling the trigger on oneself. So perhaps, since my co-player would
be 5/6 likely to survive, the VC would simply hand him the gun and invite him to
return the courtesy, only this time without spinning the chambers. I would then
be placed second in an unspun five-round ADG. The probability of my dying in
Round 1 would be 1/5, as distinct from the mere 1/6 I had just imposed on
him. If I survived Round1 and the gun was returned to me, I would be imposing
1/4 on him in Round 2, but  at the cost of incurring 1/3 for myself in Round 3.
And, of course, 1/2 for him in Round 4 would cost me dearly in Round 5!
But, of course, the game would never be allowed to go this far. For
whoever held the gun in Round 4 would be a fool to let it out of his hand for
Round 5. So whoever held it in Round 3 would be a fool to let it out of his
hand for Round 4. And so on. In short, if I am contemplating turning the gun on
my co-player rather than myself, I might just as well plan to keep firing at him
and hope the VC do not intervene. But, of course, they would intervene,
because this is not the kind of entertainment they are looking for. So reversal is
no more an option than refusal because it will likely invite a like penalty.5
Rebellion:
This, of course, leaves rebellion, which is not an option because there is only
one bullet in the gun. If I turn the gun on my captors I have a 1/6 chance of
scoring a hit. And of course if I fail I might as well continue, since now I have
1/5, then 1/4, then 1/3, then 1/2, then certainty. So clearly the VC will intervene,
probably by means of a bullet in my back.
Paradoxically enough, my only hope is that I hit on the first pull. For then
our circumstances would be identical to those that must have obtained at the
time of my capture. That is, in the firefight leading up to my surrender, surely I
killed at least one of their comrades. Only subsequently did I drop my weapon
and throw up my hands. If they were not disposed to take revenge for their
fallen comrade then, why do so now? So, given that all I hold in my hand is an
empty gun, why shoot me?6
At the very least, however, I can expect the same penalty I would have
incurred had I either refused or reversed. So, as I say, rebellion is not - or at
least not yet - a live option either.
To the bafflement of the VC - and to the bafflement of Nick, who is
informed of Mike’s plan just before they are brought up from their holding pen
for their encounter - Mike asks for not one but three bullets in the gun. With
some initial suspicion the VC accede. But their apprehension eases when
Mike draws Round 1 and plays it. And it eases still further when Mike then
instructs an obedient Nick to play Round 2. On Round 3, of course, Mike
turns the gun on his captors. As one of them goes down Nick grabs his rifle,
and together he and Mike dispatch the remaining VC, eventually making it
back to behind their own ‘lines’.
Our questions are twofold. First, this ‘happy’ ending notwithstanding,
what did Mike think he was doing? And second, supposing our answer is that,
“He was just acting rationally!”, why did the VC let him do it? Let’s see.
 II. SHOOTOUT
Mike has been thinking. He realizes that there are two games going on here,
one between captives, and one between captives and captors. The VC want
him to focus on the former. And, as we have seen, they have set the two games
up so that he is always better off focusing on it. But Mike is also keeping an
eye on this second game. And he is especially anxious to see if he can
reconfigure things so he can refocus on it. For what is really going on here, he
realizes, is just a straightforward game of Shootout (SO).
Of course, were the VC interested in ‘playing fair’, they would have re-
armed both captives  and then, on the count of three, the two sides would just
have had it out. But the wages of having lost yesterday’s battle are that the VC
- we count eight of them - are taking the Americans on one at a time. A six-in-
six gun against eight fully loaded automatics would be fairer than a five-in-six
one, a five-in-six fairer than a four-in-six, and so on. But what the VC have been
offering up to now is (what we might call) the minimally fair fight, i.e. a one-in-
six gun against eight fully loaded automatics. Mike is simply proposing a fairer
fight - though he is hoping, of course, the VC will mistake this proposal as
having something to do with the other game.7
Mike has reasoned further that drawing on the VC - what we erstwhile
called rebellion - in the one-in-six game would  be tantamount to suicide. At
most he would have one or two pulls on the trigger before being cut down. So
to rub salt into the wounds of his powerlessness, the VC have offered him an
alternative game. Take the one-in-six shot he would have taken at them and
take it at himself. And why is this a live alternative? Because provided the
chamber is empty, the same alternative will be offered to his co-player, then
back to him, and so on, until one of them finds a full chamber. And the
incentive, presumably, for choosing this alternative game is that, once all but
one player is dead, the VC will withdraw whatever conditions are imposing this
unfair version of SO.
Fair enough, thinks Mike. But, to equivocate, not very fair. It could
certainly be made fairer by allowing him two bullets. (By this ‘it’, remember,
Mike is thinking of the SO game, not the alternative one, i.e. ARR.) Fairer still
by allowing him three, and so on. He realizes he cannot ask for six. But this is
not because eight VC, each with a fully loaded automatic, would necessarily
refuse to take him on with a six-in-six gun in the SO game. Rather it is because
a six-in-six gun precludes the alternative game, and it is that game that the VC
are concerned to promote. And why can Mike not ask for a six-in-six gun in the
alternative game? Because whoever drew Round 1 would have no choice but
to refuse, reverse, or rebel. Refusal would not be an option. And, as we have
already seen, neither would reversal. So he would have to rebel, which is just to
play SO with a six-in-six gun, which is not the game the VC are interested in
playing.
Then how about asking for five? If the first player survives, the chambers
will have to be spun, since otherwise the second player will be in the same
position as the first player in the six-in-six game. So the five-in-six game is just
the one-in-six game save with a probability of survival so low that it will toggle
to SO. So asking for five would be futile. And, in all likelihood, likewise for four.
Less so for three. And less so again for two. And one is just the game we are
already playing.
Note that I say that asking for four would ‘in all likelihood’ be futile. I say
this because nothing in the first-order utility function of any (n<6)-in-six game
necessitates that it toggle to SO. That is, it is true that the expected utilities of
playing the alternative game and toggling to SO vary inversely and directly,
respectively, with the number of bullets in the gun.8 But it is also true that
there is very little improvement for the gunfighter outnumbered eight automatics
to one-revolver in going from a one-in-six revolver even to a six-in-six. This is
because he is still likely to get only a round or two off before he is cut down. So
what Mike needs is not just a conversion to SO, but conversion to an SO in
which he has some hope of survival. And for that, he seems to have decided,
not only does he need to play the alternative game with rules friendly to
conversion to SO. He also needs to toggle to SO under conditions friendly to
converting the eight-automatics-to-one-(n<6)-in-six-revolver gunfight to one with
better odds. Even a six-in-six gun against eight VC all on Valium would leave
two VC standing. He can never hope to equalize. But he can hope to minimize
the inequality. But even if he gets his own hands on an automatic, he is still too
outnumbered. So, in short, he needs Nick’s help in the forthcoming SO. And he
will incur for himself - and impose on Nick - whatever risks he deems
necessary to get to that optimal point.
But not, nota bene, categorically! He needs Nick to either take the bullet
in the alternative game - in which case Mike emerges its clear winner - or else
to help in the SO. So notwithstanding that Nick is probably named in honor of
the patron saint of Christmas, his role in The Deer Hunter is more akin to that
of the sacrificial lamb of the Passion. That, as it turns out, Nick’s life is saved
along with Mike’s by his willingness to self-sacrifice sustains the analogy. One
crucial difference, however, is that Nick does so inadvertently, as little more
than a dupe. Still ...
 
III. THE THREE-IN-SIX UNSPUN GAME
Mike has already taken pains to have engaged the VC leader in a contest of
machismo. If the latter has to think too long and hard, he loses face, both to
Mike and to his own subordinates. So he accedes. He places three bullets in
the gun, spins the chambers, and then the gun itself.
It is unclear whether the chambers are to be spun between rounds at
this point or not. First we will assume they are not. (Momentarily we will analyze
the spun scenario.) So at this juncture note - and not just in passing - that there
are twenty ways in which the chambers can be loaded. Let 1 be the name of
the chamber positioned under the hammer after the gun is loaded and spun.
Then the bullets can be distributed:
 
123, 124, 125, 126, 134, 135, 136, 145, 146, 156,
234, 235, 236, 245, 246, 256,
345, 346, 356, and
456.
Now note that these twenty positions can be subdivided into three sets, within
which each is a priori phenomenologically indistinguishable. The three-in-a-
row set includes
 
123, 126, 156, 234, 345, and 456.
 The alternating set is made up of
135 and 246.
And the remaining twelve arrangements,
124, 125, 134, 136, 145, 146, 235, 236, 245, 256, 346, and 356,
 form the two-and-one set. Within the phenomenologically three-in-a-row set,
however, the 126 and 156 are lemons. They look as sweet as the 123, 234,
345, and 456, but they do not provide a three-in-a-row in fact.. But, as I say,
from the perspective of the loader they are as good as the other four.
So, how should one load the chambers? Were Mike or Nick loading, to
determine which of the three patterns available he should chose one need only
average the expected rebellion utilities (ERUs) of each of the three categories
and opt for the highest. (ERUs will be characterized momentarily.) As it
happens, however, the VC leader does the loading, so presumably he will
chose the pattern with the lowest average ERU. In this case, as we will see,
each of the three loadings have the same ERU. So I mention the ‘loading
game’ here only because there might be other Deer Hunter-esque scenarios in
which the ERUs of the loadings are not equal. Eventually I hope to construct a
more general theory of which this one will prove nothing more than a special
case.
Now here is the rub. If Mike and Nick can hold off their rebellion until
after Round 1 - assuming, of course, the first player survives it - they are then
facing
 234, 235, 236, 245, 245, 345, 346, 356, and 456.
 Since, as we are about to see, ERUs diminish as we move down
arrangements as first listed - and since, after Round 1, 234 becomes
equivalent to 123, 235 to 124, and so on - eliminating the first ten
arrangements has the effect of raising the average ERU from the average
ERU of all twenty loadings to the average ERU of only the first ten. So in
complying in Round 1, Mike pays a 10/20 chance of incurring death for a
10/20 chance of raising the average ERU of a Round 2 rebellion by the
difference between the two average ERUs.
And had that been enough to warrant toggling from ARR to SO, that is
when the second player should have rebelled. But, apparently, it was not
enough. The second player now incurs a 6/10 chance of death for the privilege
of being able to eliminate all but
 345, 346, 356, and 456.
 Since these now shift over and become 234, 235, 245, and 345, the average
ERU rises again. The Round 3 player could, of course, pay the 3/4 chance of
death it would cost him to pass the 456 (now a.k.a. 123) gun on to his partner.
But at that point the game would have to be stopped. And if the game were
stopped and the gun re-spun, the players would have incurred 10/20, 6/10, and
3/4 chances of death in Rounds 1, 2, and 3 respectively, for absolutely
nothing! So rebellion is mandated no later than the end of Round 3.
But that final 3/4 is a terribly high price to pay for a three-in-a-row that
one might have had for nothing. In fact that he could only have had for nothing.
That is, by complying in Round 3 he has a 1/4 chance of delivering the 456
gun into own hands. And by rebelling in Round 3 he has a 1/4 chance of
already having the 345 gun in his hands! By rebelling in Round 3 he runs the
risk of giving himself the 346 or the 356. But neither is that much worse than
the 345. So he should rebel at Round 3. But, as we will see, if the Round 3
player should rebel rather than comply, the VC should never have let him have
the gun after Round 2!
 IV. REBELLION UTILITIES
Assigning expected utilities in situations like these is iffy, but the following
information provides us at least some guidance. The VC leader is unarmed.
Each of Mike and Nick has a VC guard on either side of him. By deflecting the
barrels of their automatics upwards or to the side at the moment of rebellion,
the rebels can be reasonably certain that the rebelling player can have two or
three free pulls before any of the four guards can recover, and/or any of the
remaining three VC will be mustered from their slumbers.
Suppose - as turns out to be the case - it is Mike who rebels. Then Mike
needs to fell one of Nick’s guards so that Nick can grab that guard’s automatic
as he goes down and then join in the rebellion. Accordingly, assuming that at
such close quarters no shot will go amiss, I shall assign - but only for simplicity,
and at that only as a very rough approximation - a kill each for a full chamber in
Pull 1 and/or Pull 2. But because the chances of getting off subsequent pulls
diminish thereafter, I shall assign a half a kill for a full chamber at Pull 3, 1/4 for
Pull 4, 1/8 for Pull 5, and 1/16 for Pull 6. The rebels need a total of eight kills,
at least five of which will have to come from the automatic seized by Nick. So
the sooner Nick can commandeer that weapon, the higher the ERU of the
loading giving rise to that commandeering. So we can say that the ERU of
123 > the ERU of 124, the ERU of 124 > the ERU of 125, and so on to 456
with the lowest. And so we can say that
 it is rational to rebel at point x if and only if the ERU of
rebellion at that point is greater than the expected utility of
compliance (ECU) at that point.
 
Recall further that a loading that eventuates in both Mike and Nick
surviving has a higher utility than one which leaves only one of them standing.
But a scenario in which Mike is the sole survivor in the alternative ARR game
is preferable (for Mike) to one in which Nick is the last and sole man standing
in the SO game. And, presumably, mutatis mutandis for Nick. Accordingly, in
any spun game - be it the one-in-six or the three-in-six - the ECU for Mike of
Nick’s compliance is always slightly higher than the ECU of his own. Mutatis
mutandis for Nick. But for any given player the ECU of his (or his co-player)
complying remains constant from round to round. So if it is rational for one
player to rebel at point x, it is likewise rational for the other to rebel at point x+1
or x-1. So if it is rational to rebel at any point, it is rational to rebel immediately.
Not so - or at least not obviously so - in the unspun game. In the unspun
game - be it the one-in-six or the three-in-six - the ECU for Mike of Nick’s
compliance is always considerably higher than the ECU of his own. And for
any given player the ECU of his complying decreases significantly from round
to round; and the ECU for him of his co-player complying increases
significantly from round to round. So, all that said, here is ...
V. THE PARADOX AND THE PROOF
 Neither the 346 nor the 356 yields sufficient utility to warrant compliance at
Round 3. And if the VC know that, then, as I say, they should not have given
the gun to the Round 3 player. But then if that is the case, the Round 2 player
should never have let it out of his hands at the end of Round 2. In fact, what is
the difference between the Round 3 player rebelling at the beginning of
Round 3 and the Round 2 player rebelling at the end of Round 2?! So the
Round 2 player should rebel at the end of Round 2! But, as before, if the
Round 2 player is going to rebel at the end of Round 2, the VC should never
have let him have the gun after Round 1! But that being the case, the VC
should never have let him have the gun for Round 1!
Furthermore, the 6/10 chance of death the Round 2 player would be
incurring in complying in Round 2 is a very high price to pay to deliver the
rebellion bundle of 345, 346, 356, and 456 into his own hands. For he has a
1/10 chance of already having in his hands the 234, which is equivalent to the
345 he would have a 1/4 chance of giving himself if he complied. But we do not
have to speculate about the sagacity of this trade-off. Nor about the relative
utility yields of the 235, 236, 245, and 256. For from the simple fact that he
would have to rebel after Round 2, the VC could not let him have the Round 2
gun. But that means that the Round 1 player could not let it out of his hands!
And since the Round 1 player would have to rebel after Round 1, the VC could
not let him have the gun either! So, it would seem, it is as unreasonable for
Mike to ask for the three-in-six gun as for the four, five, or six. And yet Mike did
ask for it. And they gave it to him! So clearly something is amiss. But what?
Let’s formalize our reductio for the unspun three-in-six case. It rests, as
already noted, on the following recursion cycles. Assuming that
 
1) one can only either comply or rebel, that
2) every action is either rational or irrational, and that
3) if it is rational for a player to rebel it is irrational for the VC to let that
player have the gun, and noting that
4) it is categorically irrational to comply in Round 4, it follows from (1), (2)
and (4), that
5) it is rational to rebel in Round 4. But
6) if it is rational to rebel in Round 4, then it follows from (1), (2), and (3)
that it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 4 player have the
Round 4 gun in the first place. So from (5) and (6) it follows that
7) its irrational for the VC to let the Round 4 player have the Round 4
gun. But
8) if it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 4 player have the gun, it is
irrational for the Round 3 player to let it out of his hands at the
end of Round 3. So from (7) and (8) it follows that
9) it is irrational for the Round 3 player to let the gun out of his hands at
the end of Round 3. Since
10) the only way he can prevent it being taken out of his hands at the
end of Round 3 is to rebel with it, from (9) and (10) we get
11) it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 3. But
12) if it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 3, then it follows from (1),
(2), and (3) that it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 3 player
have the Round 3 gun in the first place. So from (11) and (12) we
get
13) it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 3 player have the gun. But
14) if it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 3 player have the gun, it
is irrational for the Round 2 player to let it out of his hands at the
end of Round 2. So from (13) and (14) it follows that
15) it is irrational for the Round 2 player to let it out of his hands at the
end of Round 2. But since
16) the only way he can prevent it being taken out of his hands at the
end of Round 2 is to rebel with it, from (15) and (16) we get
17) it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 2. But
18) if it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 2, then it follows from (1),
(2), and (3) that  it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 2 player
have the Round 2 gun in the first place. So from (17) and (18) we
have
19) it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 2 player have the gun. But
20) if it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 2 player have the gun, it
is irrational for the Round 1 player to let it out of his hands at the
end of Round 1. So from (19) and (20) it follows that
21) it is irrational for the R1 player to let the gun out of his hands at the
end of Round 1. And since
22) the only way he can prevent it being taken out of his hands at the
end of Round 1 is to rebel with it, from (21) and (22) we get
23) it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 1. But
24) if it is rational to rebel at the end of Round 1, then it follows from (1),
(2), and (3) that it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 1 player
have the Round 1 gun in the first place. So from (23) and 24) we
can conclude that
25) it is irrational for the VC to let the Round 1 player have the gun from
the outset.
Quod erat demonstrandum. The VC should never have allowed Mike and Nick
to play with a three-in-six unspun gun!
 
VI. THE SUB-LEMMA FOR NOT FORFEITING THE GUN
The only premise recursions independent of (1), (2), (3), and (4) are (10-16-
22), and (8-14-20). (10-16-22) seem to be true enough. But what about (8-14-
20)? Why not let the gun be taken out of one’s hand?
Our answer has been that by forfeiting the gun at the end of Round 3,
the VC will simply spin it before handing it on to the Round 4 player. So Mike
and Nick would have just gone through Rounds1 through 3 for absolutely
nothing! But then the same could be said - could it not? - of each of the
potentially infinite series of one round games that were played prior to Mike
asking for more bullets. Every time a pair of rounds is completed without
‘resolution’, those rounds were played for ‘nothing’! But every time a round is
played it is played for anything but nothing. So the “x is played for y” relation
neither aggregates nor decomposes. What of it?! Besides, in the three-in-six
game in which the gun is returned to the VC for re-spinning after Round 3, the
Round 4 player is then, in essence, playing Rounds 1 and 3 of an unspun
three-round three-in-six game. If both players survive, then the player who only
had to play Round 2 in this game will have to play Rounds 1 and 3 in the next
one. And so on. So the arrangement is not ‘unfair’! So, (8), (14), and (20) are
mistaken. So the reductio does not go through.
But this is too quick. As the Round 3 player I might be disposed to
comply rather than rebel if and only if I understand that if I survive, my co-player
will be required to play Round 4 with an unspun gun. If this is the case and the
VC know it - or even if it is not the case but they believe it is - I cannot be given
the Round 3 gun. But now suppose the Round 2 player will not comply unless
he believes the Round 3 player will, and he believes the Round 3 player will
not comply. So neither can the Round 2 player be given the gun. And likewise
with the Round 1 player. So notwithstanding the a priori fairness of the three-
round three-in-six game, it cannot be gotten off the ground! Thus, I submit, (8),
(14), and (20) stand.
VII. THE REDUCTIO EXTENDED TO THE ONE-IN-SIX UNSPUN GAME
None of which, in and of itself, is all that surprising. But now consider the
following extension of the proof:
The only difference between a three-in-six game and a two-in-sixer -
and then between a two-in-six game and a one-in-sixer - is the number of
recursions required to reach the same conclusion, i.e. that one ought not to be
given the gun in the first place because he should rebel the moment it is given
to him. Instead of three recursions of the six-line cycle employed above, we
simply add another six-line cycle for the two-in-six case, thereby merely
delaying the conclusion to line (31), or another two six-line cycles for the one-in-
six case, thereby delaying it to line (37). So, quod erat demonstrandum,
37) it is irrational for the VC to let t he R1 player have even
a one-in-six gun from the outset for an unspun game.
 And this is, surely, a very surprising result indeed! The VC erred grievously in
acceding to the three-in-six unspun game. Mike compounded that error by not
rebelling in Round 1, and again by forfeiting the gun after a successful
compliance. The VC reiterated their error by allowing the gun to be passed to
Nick. Nick compounded Mike’s error by not rebelling in Round 2, and again
by forfeiting the gun after his successful compliance. And the VC erred a third
time by allowing the gun to be passed back to Nick. But what we have
discovered now is that
 37)  it would have been an error for the VC to have
acceded to even a one-in-six unspun game.
 And this in spite of our having long since granted that
 38) it would be irrational for Mike or Nick
to rebel with a one-in-six gun!
VIII. AND THENCE TO THE ONE-IN-SIX SPUN GAME?
 But did we decide that it would be irrational for Mike or Nick to rebel with a
one-in-six gun because they could assume the gun would be spun? No. We
decided it would be irrational for Mike or Nick to rebel with a one-in-six gun
because rebelling with a one-in-six gun is tantamount to suicide! So what we
have discovered, it seems, is that rebelling with a one-in-six gun can be
rational or irrational depending on whether the would-be rebel anticipates that
the gun will be spun after a successful compliance.
Fair enough. But then suppose he does not know whether it will be spun
or not? Or, even if he does, suppose he knows his co-player does not know
whether the gun will be spun or not after his successful compliance. Or even
that he does not know whether his co-player knows whether the gun will be
spun or not after his successful compliance. What should he do?
It might be supposed that the slightest doubt on either score will force
the player with the gun to rebel, albeit suicidally. But even this is too quick. Why
not comply and let one’s co-player commit the suicidal rebellion, thereby
winning the ARR game by default? Why not indeed?! But of course if Mike can
think to think this way, so can Nick. And it is this feature of the one-in-six game
that is allowing the VC to allow Mike and Nick to play the one-in-six game.
If this is what is allowing the VC to allow Mike and Nick to play the one-
in-six spun game, why is it not allowing them to let them play the one-in-six
unspun game? After all, from the perspective of the Round 1 player - say Mike
- what distinguishes the two games? That after successful compliance, in the
spun case Nick will be in the identical position he was just in, whereas in the
unspun case Nick will be playing a one-in-five game. Rebellion with a one-in-
five gun is as suicidal as rebellion with a one-in-six gun. So if it would have
been rational for Mike to comply in Round 1 in the unspun game, it would
likewise be rational for Nick in Round 2. Likewise then for Mike in Round 3,
for Nick in Round 4, for Mike in Round 5, and then for Nick in Round 6. But it
would not be rational for Nick to comply in Round 6. So neither could it be
rational for Mike to comply in Round 1. Apparently, then, that rebellion is
suicidal is not a knock-down argument against it. So the only knock-down
argument must be that it is suicidal and unavoidable. It is unavoidable in the
unspun game, because of recursion. But since the spun game lacks this
recursion feature, suicide is avoidable. It can be avoided by one’s co-player
either complying unsuccessfully or else rebelling. Since one’s co-player will not
rebel, this leaves his unsuccessfully complying. And this is just what the VC are
counting on Mike and Nick counting on.
 IX. CONSEQUENCES
 So, what follows from all or any of this? Well, among other things, that there
are some situations - more instructively, situations involving this recursivity
feature - in which the rationality (or irrationality) of an action seems to be, in a
highly instructive sense,  independent of that action’s expected utility. Provided
only that the action at the head of the recursion would be countenanced
because of its expected utility, an action down the recursion line can inherit
that sanctionability even if it’s own expected utility would counsel against it.
And that, I submit, might have very important consequences indeed. For
example:
The core explanatory primitive in the game theoretic reduction of social
and political philosophy is the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). But PDs come in two
varieties: those in which the gain in aggregate expected utility from mutual
defection to mutual cooperation - a.k.a. the cooperative dividend - is divisible,
and those in which it is not. In the case of the latter the PD is solved by
instituting (or acquiescing to) some external enforcement mechanism like
Hobbes’ Sovereign, or some internal mechanism like ingesting Gauthier
constrained maximization pill. But where the cooperative dividend is divisible,
resolution of the dilemma - even supposing a mechanism for resolving it is
available - awaits resolution of the Bargaining Dilemma embedded within it.
Suppose, for example, you and I severally can  produce one and two widgets
respectively, but together we can produce seven. We can access this four-
widget dividend if and only if we can agree on how to split it. Since it would be
irrational for you not to agree to a net gain of one, it would be irrational for me
to settle for anything less than a net gain of three. But likewise reason you. And
so we are back to where we started from. Only this time instead of being in
another PD we are actually in a series of Chicken dilemmas, one for each of
the concessions each of us could - though we would rather not - make to the
other.
But, as it happens, the single most recalcitrant problem in the entire
corpus of game theory is how to hone this overdetermination in Nash equilibria
in Chicken. And what Deer Hunter has to tell us is why. Why does the
rationality of my acceding to a net gain of even one penetrate to inform the
irrationality of your acceding to anything less than three, and likewise in
reverse? Because the rationality of my broad compliance penetrates to inform
your narrow compliance. Why likewise in reverse? Because this penetration
reverses. And so why - in the absence of a pre-commitment strategy in the
meta-game - are we destined to crash? Because this reversive penetration is
recursive. In other words, rational choice theory is stymied in Chicken because
it is stymied in Deer Hunter. And it is stymied in Deer Hunter because it has
yet to develop an account of maximizing under conditions of recursive
reversivity.
What might such an account look like? Here I can only handwave. And
not just because space does not permit a more satisfying treatment. What I
suspect is that it is in Deer Hunter that rational choice theory has met its
Wittgenstein’s ladder. That is, the Deer Hunter paradox is a member of the set
of logical paradoxes that arise from either Cantorian diagonalization or
looping. But instead of getting an infinite regress - as one does in most
diagonalization or looping paradoxes - what we get in Deer Hunter is an
outright contradiction. In any event what we get is that rational choice theory is
either consistent but incomplete or else complete but inconsistent.
How does one resolve inconsistencies and/or incompletenesses
elsewhere on the logical landscape? By going extra-logical. But that is another
paper.9 Just how much damage all this does in the meantime to the received
theory of rational choice, I leave for another day. Or lifetime.
 
Endnotes 
1A book-length manuscript on the implications of The Deer Hunter for game
theory is currently in its all-but-final throes. But I suspect even it will prove only
the tip of a very deep iceberg indeed.
 
2As indeed - by virtue of the underdetermination of rule by any data - are the
rules by which we live with one another!
3'Dead’ is harsh. But such are also the wages of freeway driving. Furthermore,
insofar as longevity is a function of wealth, we could as readily imagine our
captives, or ourselves, playing ARR for dollars. If the chamber is full we die not
now but twenty years earlier than we would otherwise. In fact, is not that
precisely the choice situation facing a Third World street urchin contemplating
whether to attempt or forgo the mugging of a wealthy First World tourist? Nor
need outcomes always be so dire or expressed so negatively. Instead of
focussing on our deaths, we could think about the chances we take - chances
imposed on us by others - for quality of life. For example, it is not just that my
second-hand smoke might kill you. It is also that it stinks! So now think about
dining at an otherwise excellent restaurant but with no no-smoking section.
How many smokers in the restaurant will it take to warrant deciding to eat
elsewhere? 
4One contribution made by game theory to social and political philosophy that
makes it such a breakthrough is that by identifying game-tokens by their
payoffs and then their types by their choice matrices, one can thereby collapse
all kinds of ‘distinctions without a difference’ that have for centuries mired the
thinking of laypersons and philosophers alike. Thus, for example, there can be
no difference - certainly none worth going to war about - between a socialist
political economy with incentives for productivity and a capitalist one without
constitutional constraints on government taxation powers. So, what is in a
name? A rallying cry for some other agenda. An agenda we would do well to
pull out from its dust-jacket. Likewise with liberty- and equality-talk. If it were
true that we put criminals in jail as punishment, not for it, then if I were the last
law-abiding citizen, I would be the only one in jail. If it were true that Rawls’
famous Equality Principle took lexical priority over his Difference Principle,
then South Africa under Apartheid would have been trying to keep its own
backs in rather than the Mozambique blacks out! So, not unlike in Introduction
to Business, the first thing we should be teaching in Introduction to Philosophy
is, “People, attend to the bottom line!” 
5Many situations share this recursion feature, such that once one gets started
it is best to just ‘damn the torpedoes’ and keep on going. Coups d’etat are
often like that. And it is precisely because they are like that that they
sometimes succeed when otherwise they would run out of steam. So one way
to reduce their chances of success is to deprive them of this feature. One does
that by, for example, making it a practice not to execute unsuccessful would-be
coup leaders and their followers. Unfortunately, granting such amnesty also
tends to encourage assaults on the palace. And so this too is an equilibrium
problem. 
6This paradox is often manifested in very comical ways. Saddam Hussain
draws his line in the sand. The Americans step over it. “Okay,” he warns, “now
this time I really mean it!” And so on. The most rehearsed advice for these
situations is to adopt a pre-commitment strategy. That is, notwithstanding that
it would be irrational for me to retaliate against this particular provocation, I
transparently hardwire myself to so anyhow. (See, for example, Gregory
Kavka’s Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence, Cambridge U.P., 1987) 
7This business of dissimulating as to which, of the various simultaneous
games we have going with one another, some move I am making belongs,
does considerable work in political economy. Here is a case in point. At the
Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) meetings in Charlottetown, Prince
Edward Island, in the spring of 1992, after rancourous debate the CPA passed
a resolution calling on each Department in the country to seek a 25% female
professorate by the year 2000, and 40% by ten years thereafter. One
Department - which shall remain unnamed - vigorously supported the motion,
appearing thereby - and, it seems, successfully - to put the lie to its reputation
as having been tardy in joining the ranks of the ‘politically correct’. What the
pro-quota lobby failed to notice, however, was that the re-ranking from merit-
only to gendered implicated by the resolution meant that the burden of any sub-
optimal appointments would fall not at all on Departments at or near the top of
the plumb line, increasingly as one moves down it, and then inversely as one
approaches the bottom, where, all the qualified women having already been
taken, excellent male candidates who would erstwhile have been unavailable
could then be snapped up for a song. The Department in question was, of
course, just so ideally situated, and has since managed to improve its standing
by both measures: qualify of appointments and (at least the appearance of)
political correctness. Thus the problem with the Principle of Double Effect - or
any other principle involving autonomous effects - it that it is often impossible to
determine which effects are autonomous and which are intended. In short, the
road to paradise is paved with good intentions. But it is the sub-bed that one
has to look out for! 
8ARR is precisely the game the Russian peasant was being forced to play on
the German front from 1914 to 1917. And in some cases with payoff matrices
not dissimilar to those in The Deer Hunter. The conversion to Shootout could
not, and did not, take place until the combination of a rising kill ratio at the front
(number of bullets in the gun for the one game) and arms in the hands of the
revolutionaries (number of bullets in the gun for the other) reached the requisite
critical mass to countenance the conversion. Tsar Nicholas erred grievously in
hoping he could keep the game from toggling by offering only marginal and
incremental improvements. But to be fair, these are hard balances to get just
exactly right. What distinguished ‘civilized’ societies, like that most of us enjoy,
from more ‘barbarous’ places like those the smouldering and blood-soaked
ruins of which fill the CNN screen every night, is just that we have mechanisms
for monitoring and responding to sub-communities that are nearing their toggle
points, whereas these ‘savages’ do not. 
9See my manuscript on “Extra-Logicality”.
